We give recursive definitions for the Banzhaf Value and the Semivalues of cooperative TU games. These definitions were suggested by the concept of potential for the Shapley Value due to Hart and Mas-Colell and by some results of the author who introduced the potentials of these values and the Power Game of a given game.
Introduction
After some notations and concepts needed in this paper, as well as some references including earlier results, we give a new proof for the recursive definition of the Shapley Value in the second section. The Banzhaf Value is discussed in the third section and the last section is devoted to the Semivalues and generalizations of both the Shapley Value and the Banzhaf Value.
As will be seen below, the proofs for these new characterizations are using different tools and auxiliary results, interesting by themselves. Let be a set of players, | | = ; a cooperative transferable utilities game (or TU game) is a function V : ( ) → , with V(Ø) = 0. Here, ( ) denotes the Power Set of , that is the set of all subsets of . It is well known that the set of all games with the set of players , denoted by ( ), with the two operations, addition and scalar multiplication, is a vector space of dimension 2 − 1. Let ⊆ be any coalition in V ∈ ( ) and denote by ( ) the space of games with the set of players . If V ∈ ( ), then the restriction of V to is a game in ( ). To avoid more difficult notations, if V ∈ ( ) is denoted by ( , V), then the restriction to is denoted by ( , V). Denote by the union of spaces ( ) for all ⊆ , ̸ = Ø. A value on is a functional Ψ on , with values in for all games ∈ ( ) and all ⊆ . In particular, for V ∈ ( ) the value gives -vectors Ψ( , V) for all subgames of V. But, we have Ψ ( , V) ̸ = Ψ ( , V), for ∈ , when ̸ = . This agrees with the game theoretic meaning of the value as a payoff; the win of player ∈ , in the subgame ( , V), which is in general different of the win of the same player in the game ( , V). A value Ψ on is a linear value, if for any game which is a linear combination, V = V 1 + V 2 with V( ) = V 1 ( ) + V 2 ( ), ∀ ⊆ , we have Ψ( , V) = Ψ( , V 1 ) + Ψ( , V 2 ).
Recall that a recursive definition of the Shapley Value is due to Sprumont, [1] . The Shapley Value [2] and the Banzhaf Value [3] are the two most popular linear values for TU games, (see also, [4] ). Instead the Semivalues, due to Dubey et al. [5] , cannot be found in all books on cooperative game theory. The main tools in the present work are some results of Linear Algebra, a concept of potential of the Shapley Value, due to Hart and Mas-Colell, [6] , as well as earlier results of the author [7] [8] [9] , that will be individually mentioned in connection with the new results. Game Theory introduced by Shapley [2] . This led, for the cooperative TU games, to the Shapley Value formula
for all V ∈ ( ), ⊆ , where = | |, = | |. Another axiomatization has been given by Hart and Mas-Colell [6] , based upon the concept of potential of the Shapley Value they have introduced. To make the paper self-contained, let us define the potential and state a major result to be used later.
For an arbitrary game V ∈ ( ), the potential of the Shapley Value is the functional , recursively defined on by
Obviously, the one-to-one correspondence on may be expressed by
where (Ø, V) = 0. Formulas (3) and (4) will be used later, together with the following result.
Theorem 1 (Hart-Mas-Colell).
If is the potential of the Shapley Value given by (3), or (4), then one has for each the equalities
On the other hand, let Ψ be the value on , recursively defined by
for each subgame ( , V) with | | ≥ 2, where V ∈ .
Example 2. To illustrate (3), consider the game
For the singletons we obtain the potentials ({1}) = 100, ({2}) = 200, ({3}) = 300, (9) and for the higher size coalitions, we get
Now, by formulas (5), we have Ψ ( , V) = (200, 300, 400) .
As it will be seen below, this is the Shapley Value. Indeed, we may check that formulas (7) give us the same components of the Shapley Value. Note that (7) allows the computation of a component by using only the worth of the characteristic function for the coalitions that contain this player. Note also that (7) uniquely defines a value.
Theorem 3 (see [10] ). The value Ψ uniquely defined by (7) is the Shapley Value.
Proof. By induction over the size of , if = { }, then we get from (1) that SH ({ }, V) = V({ }), which gives from (7) that
we compute the right hand side in (7) . From (5) we get
From (4), written for V( ) and V( − { }), we obtain
By adding up (12) and (13), we have
where the last equality follows again from the Hart/MasColell theorem. So, formula (7) gives Ψ ( , V) = SH ( , V), that proves the theorem.
We conclude that the characterization offered by the last Theorem is allowing us to consider that (7) gives a recursive definition of the Shapley Value. 
The axioms for the Banzhaf Value can be derived from the axioms for the Shapley Value, by replacing the efficiency with similar axioms. This suggests that a recursive definition may also be derived like above, but we give a more elegant approach, by using an earlier result of the author in [7] . Let us start just by giving this result. For a game ( , V), one may compute the Banzhaf Value for each subgame ( , V), for all coalitions ⊆ , ̸ = Ø. In this way, based upon formula (15), we shall build a new game ( , ), called the Power Game of ( , V), relative to the Banzhaf Value; this is given by
and it was used by the author [7] , in connection with the potential, as well as in discussing the relationship between the Shapley Value and the Banzhaf Value [8] . Note that the functional (16) gives a one-to-one correspondence, defining a unique game The above-mentioned result is Theorem 4 (see [8] ). If ∈ ( ) is the Power Game of ( , V), relative to the Banzhaf Value, given by formula (16), then one has
where and are the Banzhaf Value and the Shapley Value.
Example 5. Consider the game
a so-called constant sum game. We compute the Banzhaf Value for each subset of the player set, to find its Power Game. For the singletons, we get
For the subgames with the sets of players of size two, we get
while for the game itself, we get
For ( , V) we used the Banzhaf Value of the given game
and formula (16). Now, we may compute the Shapley Value of the Power Game, by using formula (1), to get
so that we illustrated the theorem. We did not consider the same game as in Example 2, because for that game the Banzhaf Value is efficient, so that the illustration would not be significant.
Taking into account our earlier result we may prove the following.
Theorem 6. The value Φ, recursively defined by
where ( , V) is the Power Game of ( , V) relative to the Banzhaf Value, is the Banzhaf Value.
Proof. By induction over the size of , if we have
For a fixed ∈ , assuming that we have already Φ ( − { }, V) = ( − { }, V), ∀ ∈ − { }, we compute the right hand side in (24). From (17), via (7) and the induction hypothesis, we get
where the last equality is given by the theorem stated above [8] . So, formula (24) gives Φ ( , V) = ( , V) and the induction proves the result.
If we look at (24), we notice that this is not a recursive formula, because our ( , V) enters also the right hand side in ( ). However, this objection can be removed, if we take
proved by the author in [7] . Moreover, from (27) one can derive a formula for the first two terms; for each ⊆ , | | ≥ 2, we have
a formula proved also earlier by the author in [7] .
Game Theory
In this way, we obtain from (24), via (27), the recursive definition of the Banzhaf Value:
( , V)
for all ⊆ , coalitions of size two, at least.
Example 7.
Consider the general game with three players, and assume that we use (29) and (30), and we want to find
and from these last two equalities, again via (30), we obtain
that is the usual formula (15) with = 1, for the Banzhaf Value.
A Recursive Definition for the Semivalues
Both the Shapley Value and the Banzhaf Value are particular cases of a class of values, called the Semivalues, due to Dubey et al. [5] . Let us remember that the Semivalues were axiomatically defined for all cooperative games, but for TU games the authors proved an explicit formula. This formula may be used as an approach to introduce the Semivalues, and this is the procedure used here below. Consider the weight vector ∈ , a positive vector which is normalized by
Then the functional : ( ) → given by
is a Semivalue on ( ). To extend the Semivalue to , denote the weights ( ) by ( ), = 1, 2, . . . , , and introduce the weights
to define the functional on a space ( ) with | | = − 1 by a formula similar to (34). Notice that the new weight vector satisfies a normalization condition like (33), due to the relationships between the two weight vectors. As this is very similar to the Pascal triangle relationships, we call (35) the inverse Pascal triangle relationships. This process may continue up to two person coalitions, and finally, it is enough to take the Semivalues of the singletons equal to the individual worth, to get the family of Semivalues defined on . For the axiomatization of Semivalues and the definition for more general classes of games see the above-mentioned paper by Dubey et al. [5] ; notice that in that paper the symbol has a different meaning. Note also that the Shapley Value is the Semivalue with weights ( ) = ( − 1)!( − )!( !) −1 , while the Banzhaf Value is the Semivalue with the weights ( ) = 2 1− , for all = 1, 2, . . . , . It is easy to see that the normalization conditions (33) hold in these cases and we may use the inverse Pascal triangle relationships to extend the definition on the entire space.
As in the case of the Banzhaf Value, to be able to prove a recursive definition of Semivalues, auxiliary results were needed. A relationship between the Banzhaf Value and the Shapley Value has been used in the previous section to prove the recursion formula; the same approach will be used here. To derive a recursive formula we needed also the computational formula for the Power Game; a formula, similar to (28) will be needed here too. Let us give first the Power Game formula for a Semivalue ( , V, ), associated with a weight vector denoted by and compute by (35) the weight vector 2 = (3/8, 5/8), which is also satisfying (33). Use (36) and the weight vectors to get the Power Game ( , ), relative to the Semivalue defined by the weight vector 3 . We obtain
Game Theory
Notice that the worth of the characteristic function for any coalition is expressions in the sum of the worth of coalitions of the same size. We need the formula providing the coefficients of these combinations.
Lemma 9. For any game V ∈ ( ), the Power Game (36) of V relative to a Semivalue defined by a weight vector is given by
where ( ) is the sum of the worth of coalitions of size in the subgame ( , V), for = 1, 2, . . . , , and ( + 1) is an arbitrary number.
Proof. If in (34) we replace by and by , and we make the sum (36), then for each , 1 ≤ ≤ , any coalition with size occurs with a coefficient ( ) in all components with ∈ , and with a coefficient − ( + 1); in all components with ∈ − . This proves the formula.
Example 10. If we return to our three person game of Example 8, we get
which for 3 = (1/8, 1/4, 3/8), gives the numbers computed above, as
Note that formula (40) is a general formula, which gives among other particular expressions the formula (27) for the Power Game of the Banzhaf Value, when we take ( ) = 2 1− , = 1, 2, . . . , . Recall that (27) has been used to make formula (24) a recursive formula; the same will happen in the case of the Semivalues. Now, we need a formula similar to (24), from which a much nicer recursive formula will be derived. Recall that to get (24), we used a relationship between the Shapley Value and the Banzhaf Value, proved earlier by the author. In the case of Semivalues we do not have a similar result proved in the past. Hence, first we should show the following result.
Theorem 11. Let
∈ be a nonnegative weight vector satisfying (33) and define the sequence of vectors ∈ , ≤ , by (35). Let ( , V, ), ∀ ⊆ , be the Semivalue associated with these parameters; that is,
and the Power Game of V relative to , denoted , be (36). Then, one has
Proof. We intend to prove (44) componentwise; let ∈ be fixed and suppose that the right hand side is given by the average per capita formula, due to the author in [9] . We have
where ℎ is the average worth of coalitions of size ℎ, and ℎ is the average worth of coalitions of size ℎ which do not contain player . From (43) it is clear that for a fixed coalition , ⊆ , the coefficient of
We shall prove by Lemma 9 that the coefficient of V( ) in the right hand side of (44) is the same. Obviously, with ∈ two cases may occur: (a) ∈ or (b) ∉ . (a) If ∈ , then V( ) cannot occur in any ℎ ( , V, ℎ ) with | | = ℎ, ⊆ , ∉ ; hence V( ) will not occur in ℎ ( , V, ). Instead, V( ) will occur in each ℎ ( , V, ℎ ) with | | = ℎ, ⊆ , whenever ℎ ≥ ; precisely, V( ) will occur in once with a coefficient equal to
Now, in the sum giving SH( , ) the coefficient of
We can show now that = ( ). Indeed, take ℎ = + in (47), to get a nicer form for the factor in front of the bracket. We obtain Game Theory
Obviously, the sum has − +1 terms; denote by the partial sum of the first + 1 terms. We claim that
From (48) for = 0 we get that 0 is the same as the number obtained from (49). Further, we assume that (48) holds for ≤ − − 1 and obtain
In replace
, and a simple computation will give
Hence our claim is correct. For = − we obtain the value of the entire sum, so that this is
and also in ℎ ( , V, ). The coefficient of V( ) in ℎ ( , V, ) has been computed above, so that from that coefficient we have to subtract the coefficient found in ( , V, ). To compute the last one, we use the same strategy; now V( ) will occur in each ( , V, ℎ ) with | | = ℎ, for ⊆ , ∉ , whenever ℎ ≥ ; precisely, V( ) will occur in once, with a coefficient equal to ℎ ( ) − (ℎ − ) ℎ ( + 1). The change is that now we have ( − −1 ℎ− ) coalitions with ⊆ ⊆ , ∉ . Hence, the total coefficient in the average ℎ ( , V, ), due to (46), will be
whenever ≤ ℎ ≤ − 1. Notice that ℎ = has been excluded, because contains . Now, in the sum giving SH ( , ), the coefficient of V( ) for ∉ will be
To compute the sum, take ℎ = + in (53) and get a factor in front of the bracket, similar to that shown in (51). We obtain
Fortunately, the sum in (54) is almost the same as the sum in (51), the difference is that the last term is missing. In other words, the sum (54) is the partial sum − −1 . Hence, from (52) we have
The result is proved.
Example 12. To illustrate Theorem 11, consider the three person general game from Example 8, for which the Power Game has been computed in formulas (38). Compute the Shapley Value of the Power Game; for = 1 fixed, we have
Similar computations give the other two components of the Shapley Value, and this illustrates formula (44) of Theorem 11. Now, with this result being available, we can prove a recursive definition for the Semivalues, by using the same approach as in the case of the Banzhaf Value, now based upon Theorem 11. This may be stated as follows.
Theorem 13. Let
∈ be a nonnegative vector satisfying (33) and define the sequence of vectors ∈ by (35). For any ( , V) ∈ ( ), the value Φ, recursively defined on by
for all ⊆ with | | ≥ 2, where ( , ) is the Power Game of ( , V), is the Semivalue with weights obtained from by (35).
Proof. By induction over the size of , if = { }, then from (43) we have ({ }, V,
. For a fixed ∈ , assuming that we already have Φ ( − { }, V, −1 ) = ( − { }, V, −1 ), ∀ ∈ − { }, we compute the right hand side in (58). From (44) we get via Theorem 11 that
Hence, formula (57) gives Φ ( , V, ) = ( , V, ), and the induction proves the result.
By Theorem 13, the Semivalues are uniquely defined by
for each ⊆ , | | ≥ 2, where is the Power Game relative to the Semivalue. Like in the case of the Banzhaf Value, despite the nice symmetry of the formula, this is not a recursive formula, because our ( , V, ) is also in the right hand side in ( , V, ). However, this objection can be removed, as the value of the Power Game ( , V, ) is given by Lemma 9. Now, the second term in the bracket has already been computed, but in the case of Semivalues we notice that this term cannot be put together nicely with the previous one, like in the case of the Banzhaf Value, as it will be seen in the next example.
Example 14. Return to the game considered in Example 8, and use this time the results given by formulas (38). From (60) and (38) for coalitions of size two we get
because for singletons the Power Game equals to the values of characteristic function. Now, by using (40) compute 
that is the expression given by formula (34). A similar computation gives the outcomes for the other two players, in which appear on the one hand the Semivalues of coalitions containing the new player and on the other hand the Power Game for coalitions that do not contain the new player.
As it was mentioned above, the marginal contribution of a player in the Power Game is not given by a nice formula; from (40) 
we obtain the marginal contribution of player , by taking the difference found from (40) and (64); that is, 
Note that these formulas, as the ones obtained for the Banzhaf Value, do not reduce the complexity of computations for the considered values but allow the computations componentwise. Obviously, the last fact may be written as a theorem, similar to the result obtained for the Banzhaf Value.
